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The history and philosophy of the law of contracts has more than
academic interest. In some areas there are conflicts and uncertainties
that stem from the history, nature and basis of contracts.
Primitive men were familiar with the idea of possession which later
developed into the idea of ownership. And a person having possession
or ownership has long been able to transfer whatever he had to an-
other.'
But the idea of obligation was a later development in the advance of
civilization.2 Obligations, as we know them at present, would have
been incredible to primitive men. Do we fully realize even now the
nature of an obligation? It has no tangible existence. It is only a
figment of the mind. And yet, it is a powerful means of controlling
what the obligor shall do; The obligation can be owned, bought and
sold, and inherited. Its owner can be taxed because he has it. Such
ideas are pabulum for men who are advanced in civilization and
acumen. Even now a bank depositor is likely to say that he has
money in the bank. He may, if he is a layman, really think he has
money in the bank. In truth he has nothing in the bank. He has a
claim against the bank. When the bank received his money it expressly
or impliedly undertook to make repayment. The bank thus created
and incurred obligation. That obligation is what the depositor has. The
nature of an obligation itself, and the manner of its creation, were both
beyond the ken of primitive men.
How did obligations come to be invented? And how did they get into
the fold of the common law? The growth of the obligation idea and
its recognition by the common law came about in connection with two
forms of action - debt and trespass on the case.3 The advance that
was made in connection with the action of debt was made by assimilat-
ing the creation of obligation with the transfer of property - a natural
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Dean Emeritus, University of
Cincinnati College of Law; author, The Rational Basis of Contracts (1949),
Principles of Agency (1954).
1. 1 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 56, 57 (2d ed. 1923);
2 id. at 155.
2. 2 id. at 184 et seq.
3. "So great is the ascendency of the Law of Actions in the infancy of
Courts of Justice, that substantive law has at first the look of -being gradually
secreted in the interstices of procedure; and the early lawyer can only see the
law through the envelope of its technical forms." MAINE, EARLY LAW AND
CusToM 389 (1901).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
and rational approach. The advance that was made in connection with
trespass on the case was made by branding a promisor as a deceiver
and then holding him liable for his tort- an artificial and irrational
approach.
The action of debt introduces what is substantially an obligation,
even though in theory it was in form a proprietary action. "To all
appearance our ancestors could not conceive credit under any other
form.' 14 The action was extensively used in cases where goods had
been sold on credit. It was conceived in such cases that the seller
acquired a proprietary right in the price just as a buyer did in the
goods that were sold and delivered to him. The seller's theoretical
ownership rested on the idea that the buyer had invested him with title
to a certain amount of money. It was not necessary that the buyer
should have any money on hand. But the buyer was thought of as
keeping the seller out of his own property. Under modern analysis,
how can the debt be anything but an obligation? The plaintiff, if
successful, was given a judgment for his debt and damages for the
detention thereof.5
Whether a person going into debt transfers a sum of money, as law-
yers in the fifteenth century would have said, or incurs an obligation,
as lawyers in the twentieth century would say, he does it by the same
kind of an act. The transfer is effected, or the obligation incurred, by
the enactment of his will. And that is the rational basis of all legal
transactions.
In the light of hindsight it appears that the action of debt came near
to establishing the law of contracts on a firm and rational basis. But,
alas! the action itself was doomed. Other forms of action were more
advantageous to plaintiffs.6 Debt fell into disuse. And with it fell the
advances that had been made therein toward the establishment of
contracts on a rational basis.
It was destined that the action* of trespass on the case should be the
main entrance through which 'Contracts would come into the fold of
the common law. Ever since contracts came in through that gate there
have been two contesting ideas as to why simple contracts are en-
forced. One of these bases the enforcement of contracts on a fiction;
the other, on a candid view of the facts.
Whence Came the Fiction? What Is It?
What fiction is involved? And how did it come to be used? The
4. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLIsH LAw 205 (2d ed. 1923).
5. MARTIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE AT CoMMoN LAw 41 (1905). "The ancient dis-
tinction between the judgments in debt and assumpsit when money was re-
covered was expressly abolished by the Common Law Procedure Act of
1852. Thus it may be said that debt, as finalIgt settled, is in substance an action
to obtain redress for the breach of a personal obligation to pay a certain sum
of money." Id. at 37.
6. Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 53 (1888).
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fiction is that the making of a promise followed by its nonperfol'tnance
is a deceit. And the fiction was invented to meet a supposed necessity
that the facts of a case must make out a deceit in order that the plain-
tiff could recover on a broken promise.
Let us first suppose a case of genuine deceit arising in the early
part of the fifteenth century. Assume that Skinner, a crafty person,
coveted Cornwall's horse, Pompey. Cornwall was reluctant to part
with Pompey unless he should receive the price immediately in ex-
change for the horse. But Skinner, pursuing an evil design that he
would never pay for the horse, said, "Mr. Cornwall, let me have
Pompey now and I promise to pay you, come next January first." Skin-
ner thus used a promise to accomplish his wicked purpose-to wheedle
Cornwall into giving up the horse.
Suppose further that, when January first came around, Cornwall de-
manded payment but found that Skinner had shed his sincere manner.
He utterly refused to pay and defied the demand of Cornwall. These
facts, added together, make out a case of deceit Skinner has cheated
Cornwall out of a horse. An action of trespass on the case on the
promises would be available to Cornwall.
Next suppose that, at about the same period, an honest man bought
a horse and gave in exchange his solemn promise to pay for it. He fully
intended, for all that appears, to perform his promise. But when the
promise fell due it was not performed. Such facts do not make out
that any real deceit was practiced on the seller, although the buyer
made a promise and later omitted to perform it. What could the seller
do? He could sue in debt. But that form .of action, wherein the buyer
could wage his law, was unsatisfactory. The rising sense of justice de-
manded that the plaintiff should have a more effective remedy. Some
ingenuity was required. A loose interpretation of what the judges and
lawyers of the period did is this: They put their heads together and
said, "Let's pretend that everyone who breaks a promise that was made
in the procurement of something has committed a deceit." Accord-
ingly, the making and breaking of a promise was deemed a deceit,
however honestly the defendant may have acted.7 The plaintiff's
statement of his case included such language as this: "Yet the said
C. D., not regarding his said promise, but contriving and fraudulently
intending, craftily and subtly, to deceive and defraud the plaintiff,"
etc.,8 omitted to perform. This fiction, that the promisor had committed
a deceit, was, perhaps, necessary in order that the plaintiff might sue
in trespass on the case. But that fiction, with its corollaries, has per-
7. 3 -oLswoRTm, A HISTORY -OF ENGEISH LAW 429 et seq. (3d ed. 1923);
Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HAnv. L. Rr.v. 1 (1888), reprinted in SELEcr m
READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 33 (1931), 3 SELECTED.EssAYs IN ANGLO-
Am cAN LEGAL HISTORY 259 (1909).
8. Ames, supra note 7, at 16.
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sisted long after forms of action have gone into the limbo. And it has
hindered the establishment of contracts on a rational basis.
Legal Transactions: Based on Consent of Parties Bound
Through the centuries there have been legal transactions. They are
the essence of commerce and are the means whereby every normal
adult can bargain away what he has for what he wants. Legal transac-
tions are the genus of which simple contracts should be deemed a
species. Let us notice their forms and the philosophy that is implicit
in their long and extensive use. Mention will be made of some familiar
kinds of legal transactions, ancient and modern. It will be seen that,
while they vary in form, their vital element is constant.
Livery of seisin was an ancient ceremony whereby the feoffor volun-
tarily transferred his ownership of real property to another.9 The
execution and delivery of a sealed instrument is a voluntary formality,
that has been in use for centuries, whereby the party who executes the
instrument conveys a title or assumes an obligation.10 Bills of exchange,
in ancient" as well as modern use, bind the persons who voluntarily
sign and issue them. Declarations voluntarily made by the owner of
property that he holds the property in trust for another are binding on
him. Wills that were voluntarily made, in due form, are given effect
to transfer property that belonged to the testator. Gifts of chattels
voluntarily made and accompanied by delivery are binding on the
donor. Such transactions have increased in modern times to an in-
credible volume. They include transactions both large and small, both
unilateral and bilateral. They include, for instance, the purchase and
sale of a newspaper for a few cents; the purchase and sale of a loco-
motive or a diamond or a skyscraper for a million dollars; a service
contract to have one's shoes shined for a quarter; the creation of a
complicated trust arrangement, by will or inter vivos; and, the taking
on of special duties as a carrier, bailee, er innkeeper.
Some typical legal transactions have been called to mind in the
preceding paragraph. What is their underlying philosophy? An ad-
mirable statement of that philosophy is made by Professor Fuller in
the following words:
"Private Autonomy. - Among the basic conceptions of contract law the
most pervasive and indispensable is the principle of private autonomy.
9. 2 BL. CoMvr. *315.
10. Id. at *297 et seq. The ancient Hebrews used another form. "Now this
was the custom in former times in Israel concerning redeeming and exchang-
ing: to confirm a transaction, the one drew off his sandal and gave it to the
other, and this was the manner of attesting in Israel." Ruth, IV, 7 (Revised
Standard Version 1952).
11. BRaNNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 4 (7th ed. Beutel, 1948); BuIT-
TON, BILLS AND NOTES 2 (1943); Bosanquet, The Law MercAant and Transferable
Debentures, 15 L.Q. REv. 130, 138 (1899).
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This principle simply means that the law views private individuals as
possessing a power to effect, within certain limits, changes in their legal
relations. The man who conveys property to another is exercising this
power; so is the man who enters a contract. When a court enforces a
promise it is merely arming with legal sanction a rule or lex previously
established by the party himself. This power of the individual to effect
changes in his legal relations with others is comparable to the power of a
legislature."12
Professor Fuller adds in a footnote, "What I have called 'the prin-
ciple of private autonomy' is more commonly assumed than discussed
in the Anglo-American literature."
The idea basic in all legal transactions is that a normal person can,
by his enacted will, divest himself of rights, privileges, and other
legal advantages.' 3 He can, if he wants to, derogate from his legal
position. Stated in more familiar terms, persons have for centuries
transferred their property and bound themselves in obligations by
their acts of consent.
Double Background
Simple contracts came into the common law against this double
background. On one hand such contracts had to be twisted into deceits
for procedural reasons. On the other hand a variety of legal transac-
tions gave every normal adult person power to divest himself of
property or to bind himself in obligations by suitable voluntary acts.
The purpose of the following survey is to look at the development of
simple contracts and to note particularly whether, in their maturity,
they quadrate with the fiction that each one is a deceit or with the
idea that in each one the promisor has voluntarily assumed an obliga-
tion.
Suit on a broken promise would, in some cases, lead to the same
result whether the promisor is deemed to have cheated the promisee, or
to have bound himself by his solemn consent to render a given per-
formance which he failed to render. But the corollaries are different
when a defendant is being pursued as a deceiver from what they are
when he is being pursued on an obligation that he created and failed to
perform.
A promise that is used as a device to wheedle and cheat the promisee
out of something is different in character from a promise that is made
by the way of consenting to be bound in an obligation. The fact that
the act of promising can be used as a cheating device does not mean
that it cannot, under any circumstances, be a juristic act- i.e., a con-
12. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COL. L. REv. 799, 806 (1941).
13. HOLLAND, ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE 11'7 (13th ed. 1924); MARBLEY,
ELEMENTS OF LAW 125 (6th ed. 1905); POLLOCK, A FIRST Boox rn JuRIsPRu-
DENCE 142 (2d ed. 1896); SALmOND, JURISPRUDENCE 481 (9th ed., Parker, 1937).
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senting to be bound. Consider the common transaction of a customer
borrowing one hundred dollars at a bank. The customer executes and
delivers a promise that he will repay the amount. Must that be deemed
part of a nefarious plot to get one hundred dollars from the bank and
never pay it back? Even if lawyers and judges in the fifteenth century
would have looked at the customer's promise as the first step in a
deceit, in order to satisfy'a form of action, must we cling to that view
of it? Suppose the borrower executed a mortgage to secure the loan.
The mortgage would be a conveyance. There never was any doubt that
a voluntary conveyance in due form is effective, and for the simple
reason that the grantor consented that it should divest him of his title.
The act of executing the promissory note and the act of executing the
mortgage are alike in character. Each one is a consenting to a sub-
traction from the customer's legal position. The note puts him under
obligation. The mortgage divests him of property.
Suppose that the seller of a machine undertakes to keep it in repair
for a year. He would probably do it like this: He would sign and
deliver a writing which recites substantially as follows: First, "I con-
vey the ownership of the machine," Second, "I promise (undertake)
to keep it in repair for one year." He would, in such a case, not merely
make the conveyance and the undertaking by similar acts. He would
do the two things by an identical act. It would seem that the convey-
ance and the undertaking are both effective and for the same reason -
the seller-promisor enacted his will that it should be so. The point
being emphasized is that promises are frequently a form of juristic
acts, and, like other juristic acts, are effective according to their tenor.
It is not asserted here that every promise is a consenting to be
bound. But in modern business "I promise" is generally synonymous
with "I consent to be bound" and with "I undertake." "I promise" is
common language in the making of contracts. Fiction says: a "prom-
ise" is only a cheating device. Common sense and business usage say:
a "promise" in context may be a consenting to be bound. These are op-
posing ideas. Fiction had its way at the outset. Promises were then
treated as cheating devices. The trend has been toward recognizing
promises, in suitable context, as juristic acts. The fiction idea hung on
with amazing tenacity in some groups of cases, to be noted later, such
as the cases that have to do with contracts for a third party, mailed
acceptances, and crossed offers. These groups of cases will illustrate
how slow and labored was the transition from holding promisors be-
cause they were knaves, to holding them because they consented to
be bound. But the transition is almost complete.
Consideration
The most striking reminder that simple contracts were, at first,
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taken to be deceits is the doctrine of consideration. The two elements
that were necessary to make out a plaintiff's claim for deceit were:
first, a deceitful promise made by. the defendant, and, second, a re-
sulting loss to the plaintiff. He must have been led to give up some-
thing. Both the promise and the loss to the plaintiff were necessary
to make out a true case of trespass on the case on the promises. And
even a fictitious deceit could not be conceived unless the plaintiff gave
up something in response to the promise. 14 He could not possibly have
been cheated if he gave up nothing. There had to be this loss to the
plaintiff and it came to be called consideration.
It may seem at first blush that the doctrine of consideration, still
a vital requirement in the making of simple contracts, proves that
simple contracts are still enforced only because they are a form of
deceit. The doctrine of consideration has, however, been so modified
that it is now more consistent with the idea that a simple contract is a
form of legal transaction that it is with the idea that it is a form of de-
ceit. One such modification is this: The consideration given may be
sufficient even though it has no value. Promises to pay large sums of
money made in exchange for worthless pieces of paper have been held
to be binding.'5 In such cases the deceit basis for recovery breaks
down. The plaintiff has been cheated out of practically nothing. A
second modification of the doctrine is this: consideration may be suf-
ficient to support a promise even though it was given by someone other
than the plaintiff. That is so in most American jurisdictions, 6 although
it may not be so in England. In such cases the plaintiff cannot possibly
have been cheated by the promisor. He has suffered no loss and cannot
make out a case of deceit, either real or fictitious. The defendant seems
to be held for the simple reason that his promise was a consenting to
be bound. In other words, it rests on the same basis as other legal
transactions. The consideration requirement, as it now exists, has
nothing to do with making out a deceit. It has come to be regarded
by some writers as "in effect a formality, like an oath, the affixing of a
seal, or a stipulation in court."'
17
14. "Finally, the consideration must move from the plaintiff to-day, because
only he who had incurred detriment upon the faith of the defendant's promise,
could maintain the action on the case for deceit in the time of Henry VII."
Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. Rlv. 1, 16 (1888).
15. Judy v. Louderman, 48 Ohio St. 562, 29 N.E. 181 (1891); Haigh v. Brooks,
10 A. & E. 309, 113 Eng. Rep. 119 (K.B. 1839). "A cent or a pepper corn, in
legal estimation, would constitute a valuable consideration." Whitney v.
Stearns, 16 Me. (4 Shepley) 394, 397 (1839).
16. "It matters not from whom the consideration moves...." RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 75, comment e (1932). See also Farley v. Cleveland, 4 Cow. 432
(N.Y. 1825), affd, 9 Cow. 639 (N.Y. 1827); 1 CoRINi, CONTRACTS § 124 (1950).
17. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REv. 553, 582 (1933). And
said Holmes, J., "[C]onsideration is as much a form as a seal." Krell v. Cod-
man, 154 Mass. 454, 28 N.E. 578 (1891). Consideration is, however, more than
a form of consenting to be bound. It is rather a circumstance that is indispensa-




Courts have frequently taken it for granted that there must be
"privity" between the parties in order to create a contract obligation.
But the courts have not told us what the word "privity" means. Its
meaning must be made out from the context in which the word is used.
"A sort of mystery," says Professor Corbin, "accompanies many of
our words.... ." He then indicates that "privity" is such a word.18 The
mystery deepens when we note that the word "privity" is used in two
distinct connections and that it has meanings that are necessarily dif-
ferent in the respective connections. In one connection it has to do
with the ownership of property. In the other connection it has to
do with an operative fact in the making of a contract.
In the field of property, the word "privity" has a well settled mean-
ing. It is this: "Mutual or successive relationship to the same rights
of property.... Thus, the executor is in privity with the testator, the
heir with the ancestor, the assignee with the assignor, the donee with
the donor, and the lessee with the lessor."'19
"Privity" as an operative fact in the making of a contract obligation
is altogether different from privity of estate- as described in the
preceding paragraph. When regard is had for such authority as is
available, the mysterious word, "privity," stands for a very simple
fact. It is this: communication by the promisor to the promisee. And
so, if privity should be required in order to create an obligation by
promising, it would be needful that the promisor should do two things
- enact his consent to be bound, and get notice of his act to the po-
tential obligee.
Professor Corbin defines and illustrates "privity" as a factual ex-
perience as follows:
"'Privity' may, however, be defined in terms of factual experience. Thus
where B has promised A to render a performance beneficial to C, we may
say that A is in privity with B because A was in B's presence, or be-
cause A was named or described by B, or because B pointed at A and
directed his promissory words to A. Likewise we may say that C was not
in privity because he was not physically present, he was not named by
B, and B's words and fingers were not directed at him. Such facts as
these may or may not be regarded as a good reason for denying any legal
remedy to C against B; they have not been discussed by the courts except
as they are involved in the mysterious and undefined term privity. In the
light of modem development, it must be supposed that the absence of
privity is not a sufficient reason for denying a remedy, inasmuch as C has
been given one in thousands of cases without reference to privity. The
mystery of privity remains; but it is no longer of much interest because
court action is not much influenced by it."' 20
18. 4 CoR3iN, CONTRACTS 28 (1951).
19. BLAcK, LAW DICTIONARY 1361 (4th ed. 1951).
20. 4 CoRniN, CoNTRACTs 29 (1951).
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That privity means simply communication by the promisor to the
promisee can be made out from the context in a good many cases. Note,
for instance, the case of Marston v. Bigelow,12 where Morton, C.J.,
says, "In the case at bar there was no offer to prove a promise to the
defendant ... there was no privity of contract between the plaintiff's
intestate and the defendant." Note, too, the dissenting opinion of
Comstock, J., in Lawrence v. Fox.22 He says, "In general, there must
be privity of contract. The party who sues upon a promise must be
the promisee ... ." The foregoing quotations are not accurate state-
ments of the law. They are put in to indicate what "privity" means.
Should privity be required in the making of a contract? If so, why?
That forces the question: Why is recovery allowed when one breaks a
simple contract? What is the theoretical basis for such a recovery?
Two possible bases for recovery on a simple contract have been noted.
One is a fiction to the effect that the plaintiff has been cheated by the
promisor. The other is that the promisor enacted his consent that he
should be bound in an obligation and thus created an obligation. If the
plaintiff hopes to recover on the fiction that he has been cheated, it
is an essential part of his case to show that the promise came to him
and moved him to give up something. Privity is a sine qua non if the
plaintiff must make out a case of trespass on the case as he had to do
in the fifteenth century. But this is another day. Forms of action have
been abandoned. Courts no longer require that a plaintiff must make
out trespass on the case in order to recover on a broken contract.
When the making of contract obligations are assimilated with other
legal transactions the need for privity disappears. The vital factor in
all such transactions is that the transferor, obligor or other person
who gave up legal advantage shall have consented to be bound ac-
cording to the terms of the transaction. Privity is not generally re-
quired in the making of legal transactions. Property can be transferred
to a person who has not been notified of the transfer.2 Declarations
of trust are effective without notice to the beneficiary.2 4 The appoint-
ment of an agent can be effective before communication of the ap-
pointment has come to the appointee.2 An obligation can be created
by deed without communication to the obligee.
26
Analogies drawn from other kinds of legal transactions indicate
that privity should not be necessary in the making of simple contracts.
21. 150 Mass. 45, 53 (1889).
22. 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
23. Moore v. Trott, 162 Cal. 268, 122 Pac. 462 (1912); Port Huron Machinery
Co. v. Wohlers, 207 Iowa 826, 221 N.W. 843 (1928); Wheat v. Cross, 31 Md. 99
(1869); In re Tardibone's Estate, 196 Misc. 738, 94 N.Y.S.2d 724 (Surr. Ct.
1949); Taylor v. Sanford, 108 Tex. 340, 193 S.W. 661 (1917).
24. In re Prudence Co., 24 F. Supp. 666 (E.D.N.Y. 1938); Ex parte Pye,
18 Ves. 140, 34 Eng. Rep. 271 (Ch. 1811).
25. Ruggles v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 114 N.Y. 415, 21 N.E. 1000 (1889).




Some groups of cases will be discussed in later paragraphs where the
privity requirement persisted for a long time and hindered a rational
advancement of the law. It will appear, however, that, even in these
instances, the privity requirement no longer exists in American courts,
except that there is modern authority to the effect that "crossed offers"
do not make a contract.
Measure of Damages
A shift from what may be called the deceit theory of contracts to
what may be called the juristic act theory is apparent in a change of
the rule for assessing damages when recovery is had because the de-
fendant made a promise which he did not perform. Suppose that
Cornwall delivered his horse Pompey to Skinner in exchange for
Skinner's promise to pay Cornwall one hundred dollars on the follow-
ing January first. Suppose further that the value of Pompey was fifty
dollars. In case Skinner did not perform his promise and Cornwall
gets judgment against him for damages, what should be the amount of
that judgment? That depends on the theoretical basis of Cornwall's
recovery. If Skinner is held on the deceit theory, he has cheated
Cornwall out of a fifty dollars horse and the judgment should be for
fifty dollars. But if Skinner's promise was a juristic act and as such
created an obligation to pay one hundred dollars, that is the basis for
assessing damages. Cornwall is one hundred dollars worse off when
Skinner omits to pay one hundred dollars and that should be the
amount of the judgment. Courts have long assessed damages accord-
ing to the juristic act theory. "Damages," says Dean Ames, "were
soon assessed, not upon the theory of reimbusement for the loss of
the thing given for the promise, but upon the principle of compensa-
tion for the failure to obtain the thing promised.
'2 7
The shift of simple contracts from the fictional basis that they were
deceits to a juristic act basis is implicit in another point made by
Dean Ames. "Again," says he,2 8 "the liability for a tort ended with the
ife of a wrong-doer. But after the struggle of a century, it was finally
decided that the personal representatives of a deceased person were as
fully liable for his assumpsits as for his covenants."
Contracts for a Third Party
The opposition of the deceit theory of contracts to the juristic act
theory is implicit in the long struggle that occurred before contracts
made for the benefit of third parties were upheld. As noted above, the
consideration requirement and the privity requirement are both corol-
laries of the deceit theory. On the deceit theory a plaintiff must satis-
27. Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. Rsv. 1, 15 (1888).
28. See note 27 supra.
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fy both of these requirements. He cannot have been deceived and
cheated if he gave nothing by reason of the promise. And that is so,
a fortiori, if the promise did not even come to him.
But if the plaintiff's case is bottomed on the defendant's undertaking,
as a legal transaction, the plaintiff does not claim to have been cheated.
He depends on the defendant's juristic act of consenting that he should
be bound unto the plaintiff. Questions about privity and as to who
suffered the consideration are beside the point.
Suits by third party beneficiaries, therefore, test the theory that
underlies simple contracts. Does the plaintiff, suing on a simple con-
tract, recover on the fictional deceit basis that would have supported
him in the fifteenth century? Or does he recover on the simple and
rational basis that supports a plaintiff suing on a legal transaction in
our day? In a suit brought by a third party beneficiary, the result
reached under the deceit theory of contracts would be exactly opposite
to the result that would be reached under the juristic act theory. The
deceit theory would lead to no recovery. The juristic act theory would
lead to recovery.
Courts in both England and America have shown a desire to uphold
third party beneficiaries. 29 But they have been baffled, to an extent,
by the ancient requirements that a plaintiff, in order to recover on
a broken promise, must show that the promise came to him and that
it induced him to give up something. The English courts balk par-
ticularly at the idea of allowing a plaintiff who gave no consideration
to recover.30 And even now such a plaintiff cannot, in England, have
a clean cut recovery on his contract. He is in some instances given
rights under the guise that a trust has been created in his favor.31
The American courts have been troubled particularly by the privity
requirement. They held in many early cases that the third party bene-
ficiary could not recover. But with the passing of time a trend set
in that was favorable to the third party. He can now recover in almost
all American jurisdictions. The varied and complicated reasoning that
was used by American courts in attempting to square their decisions
with the privity requirement has plagued generations of law students.
An adequate exposition of the cases whereby it came about that
a third party beneficiary can recover would be out of place in this
29. "My Lords, I confess that this case is to my mind apt to nip any budding
affection which one might have had for the doctrine of consideration. For the
effect of that doctrine in the present case is to make it possible for a person
to snap his fingers at a bargain deliberately made, a bargain not in itself
unfair, and which the person seeking to enforce it has a legitimate interest to
enforce." Lord Dunedin, in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co., Ltd. v. Selfridge &
Co., Ltd., [1915] A.C. 847, 855. See also 4 CoRBiN, CONTRACTs § 772 (1951).
30. Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co., Ltd. v. Selfridge & Co., Ltd., [1915] A.C.
847; Tweddle v. Atkinson, 1 B. & S. 393, 121 Eng. Rep. 762 (K.B. 1861); Bourne
v. Mason, 1 Vent. 6, 86 Eng. Rep. 5 (K.B. 1669).




little survey. The significant fact is: he can now recover, even though
he was not privy to the transaction and gave no consideration for his
right.
In the making of other legal transactions it is not necessary that
the designated transferee or obligee shall be privy in order to acquire
rights. And it has come to be so when a contract has been made for
a third party. Consideration is necessary to support a contract made
for a third party, as it is in all simple contracts, but iA need not be
furnished by the plaintiff. The net result is a complete victory for
the idea that a simple contract is a legal transaction. The obligor is
held because he consented to be bound, and he is held according to
the tenor of that consent.
Liability of Undisclosed Principals
Another group of cases that test the fictional deceit theory of con-
tracts against the juristic act theory are the cases of third parties
against undisclosed principals. Here again the third party is not privy
-i.e., the principal's undertaking is not communicated to the third
party. The third party is not even aware that a principal exists when
he deals with the agent. The third person cannot, under the circum-
stances, establish a case of deceit against the principal. But, under the
juristic act theory, the third party has a perfect case. The authoriza-
tion given by the undisclosed principal to his agent amounts to this:
The principal offered (consented) to become bound to a third person
if the agent should make such a deal. Our premise is that the agent
made the deal. The condition imposed by the principal (offeror) is
thus met. The principal has created an obligation against himself
by his own juristic act.
The decisions are unanimous in holding that a third person can re-
cover against a principal who was undisclosed when the third person
dealt with the agent. A good many scholars, including some notable
ones,32 have called this an "anomalous" doctrine. Why do they say
it is "anomalous"? Their objection seems to be the same as the one
urged against "third party beneficiaries" -viz., no privity; ergo, no
deceit; ergo, no recovery. But the prevailing view brushes aside the
ancient requirement of real or fictional deceit. The right of a third
party on a contract that names him as obligee or on a contract with
the agent of an undisclosed principal seems to rest squarely on the
idea that the defendant undertook the obligation and should be bound
by it.
Bargains Made by Correspondence
The question of whether a promise (undertaking) must be com-
municated to the promisee, in order to be binding, frequently comes
32. HUFFCUT, AGENCY § 120 (2d ed. 1901); Ames, Undisclosed Principal-
His Rights and Liabilities, 18 YALE L.J. 443, 445, 447 (1909); Pollock, 3 L.Q.
REV. 358, 359 (1887).
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up in connection with bargains being made by correspondence. The
question comes up- but less frequently-as to whether notice of a
property transfer must come to the transferee in order to be effective.
Let us start from base. It has been emphasized that the vital factor
in every legal transaction is the enacted will of the party or parties
who are to be bound. Each party must consent to suffer his own
burden or loss according to the terms of the transaction. The burden
may be a new obligation on his shoulders. The loss may be a divest-
ment of his property. For centuries normal persons have been able to
modify their legal positions by the making of legal transactions. This
ability, Professor Fuller aptly calls private autonomy. 3 Keeping these
fundamental ideas in mind, let us consider bargains made by cor-
respondence.
It is commonly said that a bargain is made by a "meeting of the
minds." The phrase is not at all descriptive of the way bargains are
made, particularly when they are made by correspondence. Let us
study how bilateral bargains (exchanges or contracts) are really made
by correspondence. The typical process is this: one party makes an
offer and the other party, at a later time, and in a different place, ac-
cepts by mailing a letter. The offer is a juristic act -a consenting
to be bound -e.g., to an obligation or a transfer of property. The ac-
ceptance is the same.3 Each party consents to suffer his own burden
or loss. Assuming that the offer was to make a bilateral contract, each
party has incurred an obligation. And, since the case of Adams v.
Lindsell, 5 it is elementary that the two obligations came to exist at
the moment the offeree accepted by mailing his letter. Now why
did those respective obligations come to exist? Is it because the
respective promisors deceived the promisees, or is it because the
promisors undertook (consented) to be bound?
It is possible, by a stretch of imagination, to say that the offeree was
deceived. The promise of the offeror came to the offeree and could
have moved him. But no stretch of the imagination can make out that
the offeror was deceived. He is bound before he knows of the ac-
ceptance - viz., at the moment the latter was mailed. Communication
of the acceptance to the offeror-promisee is not essential. One simple
explanation accounts for both obligations - the respective obligors
consented to take on their obligations.
Let us think of "crossed offers.136 A preliminary thought is this: In
the making of a bargain each party's consent is conditioned on his get-
ting this or that from the other party. In Adams v. Lindsell, for
33. See note 12 supra.
34. Except in the rare cases where the acceptance called for was a non-
juristic act - e.g., sawing a pile of wood.
35. 1 B. & Ald. 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818).
36. It is assumed that the reader has studied contracts and is familiar with
facts that make out a case of "crossed offers."
19541
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
instance, the offeror was willing to shoulder an obligation that he
should transfer wool to the offeree if the offeree would shoulder an
obligation to pay. And the offeree was willing to shoulder an, obligation
to pay on condition that the offeror was bound to sell. The emphasis
is that each party consented, by a suitable juristic act, to shoulder his
own obligation -but on a condition.
Now for the question of whether crossed offers make a contract. The
answer seems to depend on the basic and recurring question: why are
recoveries allowed on simple contracts? In the crossed offer cases,
neither party has been deceived. Neither one can recover if he has to
satisfy the form of trespass on the case. But every element is present
in a crossed offer case to make out a legal transaction. Each mailing
is a juristic act. It is a consenting to be bound on condition that the
addressee shall undertake a counter obligation. When the later mail-
ing occurs the respective consents have been given, and the conditions
of each one have been met. At that juncture, neither party knows that
the other party has undertaken to be bound. He is, in that respect,
like a "third party beneficiary," a third party who deals with the agent
of an undisclosed principal and an offeror who does not know that his
offer has been accepted. In these cases just mentioned, as in legal
transactions generally, it has come to be the law that the obligee does
not have notice of the undertaking in his favor in order that it shall
be effective.
There is not much judicial authority as to whether or not crossed of-
fers make a contract. The few decisions that have been rendered are
almost evenly divided on the question.37
The opposition to the idea that crossed offers should make a contract
seems to come from a failure to recognize two things: First, an. offer
and acceptance are merely the mechanics of making a contract. The
basic question is whether each party undertook to be bound. Second,
the terms "offer" and "acceptance" have technical meanings, when ap-
plied to contract making, that are altogether different from their
popular and dictionary meanings. The failure to recognize these two
things begets the sophistry: How can an offer be accepted before
it is received!3
Summary
The fiction that a promisor is liable because he cheated the promisee
37. Crossed offers do make a contract: Ruggles v. American Cent. Ins. Co.,
114 N.Y. 415, 21 N.E. 1000 (1889); Mactier's Administrators v. Frith, 6 Wend.
103, 21 Am. Dec. 262 (N.Y. 1830); Morris Asinof & Sons v. Freudenthal, 195
App. Div. 79, 186 N.Y. Supp. 383 (1st Dep't 1921); The Satanita, [1895] P. 248
semble.
Crossed offers do not make a contract: James v. Marion Fruit Jar Co., 69
Mo. App. 207 (1897); Thin v. Hoffmann, 29 L.T. 271 (Ex. Ch. 1873).
38. For a more adequate discussion of this point see FERSOx, Tnm BAsIs oF
CONTRACTS c. IV (1949).
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was used as a procedural expedient in the early history of simple
contracts. The persistence of that fiction has mystified several chapters
in the law of contracts. For instance, the labor and vacillation of the
courts in dealing with: contracts made for the benefit of third parties;
the liability of undisclosed principals; the mailed-acceptance cases;
and, the "crossed offer" cases seem to stem from the aforesaid fiction.
In the long run the fiction has given way to candor on almost all points.
The time has come when we can say with some assurance that simple
contracts are like conveyances and other legal transactions in that they
are based on the enacted wills of the persons who are bound.
This survey may seem uncalled for. That is, it may already be taken
for granted that: simple contracts are legal transactions; that they
rest on the enacted wills of the persons who are bound; and, that the
need for privity has passed out. The excuse for reviewing these
familiar problems is that it may broaden a student's understanding to
view the problems together and realize that the several problems are
basically alike. They all derive from the perennial conflict between
the fictional and the candid explanation of simple contracts.
